contingency and agency that cross-cut narratives centred on the nation-state. 2 Like Susan Williams' book on Hammarskjöld, this article does not offer a full explanation of Mondlane's assassination. Rather, by setting FRELIMO's struggle in the cosmopolitan political landscape of Dar es Salaam in the late 1960s, it shows how the movement was riven with tensions, caught up in Tanzanian affairs and the dynamics of the twin metadynamics of international affairs at the time, decolonisation and the Cold War.
Over the past decade, the rising interest in the global dimensions of the Cold War has brought scholars of the superpower rivalry into conversation with a rich body of literature exploring the history of decolonisation. 3 While successfully breaking down intradisciplinary subfields by challenging established analytical categories, this historiographical development poses a methodological problem: how to interpret such diverse forces within a single analytical framework. This article suggests that urban settings offer a potential solution, as concentrated environments in which a range of actors and dynamics -local, national, transnational, international, and global -come together. Through the geographic viewpoint of a city, physically fixed yet porous to movements of people, materials, and information, the entanglements of ostensibly separate narrative threads can be addressed without removing them from their immediate context.
In the so-called Third World, certain urban loci became epicentres of the political friction between the dual forces of decolonisation and the Cold War. The cosmopolitanism of the Saigon captured in Graham Greene's The Quiet American -a city caught between a French colonial fin-de-siècle, anticolonial fervour, and Cold War paranoia -represents a Southeast Asian example of this juncture. In Algeria and Egypt, the radical stances of the governments of Ahmed Ben Bella and Gamal Abdel Nasser led liberation movements from across the sub-Saharan and Arab worlds to flock to Algiers and Cairo. On the frontline of the struggle against white minority rule in southern Africa, 1960s Dar es Salaam assumed a similar character. 4 As Andrew Ivaska argues in his history of cultural politics in postcolonial Tanzania, the capital constituted a 'nodal point' , where circuits of global information were filtered through meshes of local understanding. 5 In the absence of relevant, accessible post-colonial archives in Tanzania and Mozambique, this article follows Daniel Branch's example in using the 'archives of repression' -in this case diplomatic despatches from foreign embassies located in Dar es Salaam. 6 While there are obvious dangers in a narrative written from the perspective of the global North, a multiarchival approach permits a degree of triangulation from different vantage points and the excavation of networks of information and interests within and passing through the city. These diplomatic sources are complemented by the limited African written sources available, here the Tanzanian press and memoirs of FRELIMO members. 
Dar es Salaam and the making of a 'Cold War city'
At the heart of the developments that turned Dar es Salaam into a hotbed of international politics was Tanzania's president, Julius Nyerere. Scholars have tended to situate Nyerere at the centre of Tanzania's post-colonial history. They focus on his vision of an African socialist path to development, based on the principle of ujamaa ('familyhood') and supposedly anchored in the communal traditions of the peasantry rather than abstract MarxistLeninism. 7 Yet as a number of recent histories have shown, Nyerere's control of ujamaa socialism was contested at both elite and grassroots levels. Although the sense of national identity that his policies fostered has proved remarkably enduring, ujamaa was replete with cultural, social, and political tensions. 8 However, in terms of Tanzania's contribution to the cause of the liberation of those African colonies under white minority rule, Nyerere's own role is clear. At Addis Ababa in May 1963, African heads of state formed the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Nyerere emphasised the continent's duty to free those still under colonial oppression. 'The real humiliating truth is that Africa is not free' , he implored, 'and therefore it is Africa which should take the necessary collective measures to free Africa. ' 9 After Tanganyika became independent in 1961, Nyerere permitted exiled liberation movements from the Portuguese territories, Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa to establish military training camps in the country. They set up offices in Dar es Salaam, where they canvassed for external support. The city also hosted the OAU's Liberation Committee, established to fund and support the guerrillas' activities. The liberation movements became a central feature of Dar es Salaam's political life. When the Polish journalist Ryszard Kapuściński passed through in January 1964, he described the scene at the bar at the New Africa Hotel, a prominent city centre watering hole.
All of Africa conspires here these days. Here gather the fugitives, refugees, and emigrants from various parts of the continent. One can spot sitting at one table Mondlane from Mozambique, Kaunda from Zambia, Mugabe from Rhodesia. At another -Karume from Zanzibar, Chisiza from Malawi, Nujoma from Namibia, etc.
[…] In the evening, when it grows cooler and a refreshing breeze blows in from the sea, the terrace fills with people discussing, planning courses of action, calculating their strengths and assessing their chances […] We, the correspondents, come by here frequently, to pick up something. We already know all the leaders, we know who is worth sidling up to. 10 Kapuściński arrived in Dar es Salaam just as two near simultaneous crises thrust the city into the international spotlight. First, the government of Zanzibar -an archipelago lying a short distance off Tanganyika's coast, which had become independent from Britain the previous month -was overthrown in a violent uprising. The revolution was grounded in a complex mixture of ethnoracial tensions, economic inequalities, and grievances at the circumstances of democratic politics around the time of independence. Days after the revolution, a barracks mutiny broke out in Dar es Salaam, forcing Nyerere to flee into hiding and then call upon British troops to put down the revolt.
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Faced with unrest at home and a neighbour drifting into communist hands -and thereby risking Western intervention -in April Nyerere secretly brokered an act of union with Karume. This tethered radical Zanzibar to the more moderate mainland government, creating the state of Tanzania. 14 Welcomed by Washington, the union curbed Zanzibar's leftward slide, but left a volatile legacy for the government of the United Republic.
In the immediate aftermath of the union, Tanzania confronted a number of foreign policy crises with its main donor partners. A dispute about the future of East German diplomatic representation in Tanzania after the union embroiled the country in the Cold War subplot of inter-German rivalry. in 1967. Nyerere insisted the decision was taken out of necessity, rather than ideological inclination.
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Conscious of the fragility of his own government, especially after the Zanzibar Revolution, the mutiny, and events in neighbouring Congo, Nyerere recognised the risks of supporting the liberation movements. The crates of weapons bound for the guerrillas that arrived in Dar es Salaam from the Soviet Union and China often did so without prior Tanzanian consent. This influx of arms concerned the government, which complained that in supplying weapons directly to the liberation movements, the communist powers were undermining the Liberation Committee's coordinating role.
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In November 1964, Nyerere ordered the number of representatives for each liberation movement in Dar es Salaam to be limited to just four. Surplus officials, the British high commission reported, were to move to 'a more remote place than the capital, where they would be less able to stir up trouble, and conversely, where foreign diplomats would be less able to subvert them. ' 21 In no small part because of the liberation movements' activities, Dar es Salaam was transformed into a 'Cold War city' , at the intersection of superpower rivalry and decolonisation. In a snowball effect, the city attracted not only liberation movements, diplomatic representations, and agents of the white minority regimes, but also an array of journalists, stringers, radical academics, and chancers in search of influential contacts or fistfuls of dollars. The city's public sphere became superheated with Cold War propaganda and the interventions of an outspoken, state-sponsored local press. The city was often engulfed in murmurings about coups. Nyerere's biographer noted that 'a sort of free-flowing paranoia sometimes seems to hang suspended in Dar es Salaam's heavy air ' . 22 Nyerere himself spoke of the danger of careless talk in the city's bars and cafés. He referred to his capital as 'Rumourville' . from offices scattered across southern Tanzania and operated a school in Dar es Salaam, the Mozambique Institute. It used the Tanzanian press to carry exaggerated body counts of Portuguese casualties and circulated a glossy magazine, Mozambique Revolution. In 1965, the Canadian high commissioner described it as 'perhaps the only such organization in Africa which is now carrying out substantial operations designed to subvert and eventually overthrow a government under European control. ' 25 President Eduardo Mondlane headed a twenty-man Central Committee. Born in Mozambique in 1920, Mondlane studied in Johannesburg and Lisbon, before moving to the United States, where he obtained degrees from Oberlin College and Northwestern University. When Mondlane was elected president of FRELIMO in 1962, he was teaching Anthropology at Syracuse University. Shortly after, he resigned his position and moved to Tanzania with his white American wife, Janet, who organised the Mozambique Institute. Mondlane did not initially support violent struggle, but felt he had little choice in the face of Portugal's intransigence. He espoused a form of grassroots socialism, attuned with a pragmatism that recognised the pitfalls of global politics in the midst of the Cold War. Mondlane believed that victory over Portugal could be achieved only with the cooperation of the peasantry in liberated areas of northern Mozambique. This was owed in part to his understanding of Mao Zedong and the experience of the Vietcong guerrillas. 26 Mondlane spent much of his time outside of Africa, attempting to build diplomatic relations, secure aid, and raise awareness about FRELIMO. Wherever he travelled, he impressed bureaucrats and politicians of all ideological shades. 'Mondlane is one of the most cultured and intelligent Africans in Dar es Salaam -a potential Kaunda, Nyerere or Adu' , wrote the British high commissioner to Tanzania. 27 Mondlane was also adept at using the opportunities provided by the international environment of Dar es Salaam to promote FRELIMO's cause. 'The most notable and refreshing African liberation figure I reported on was Eduardo Mondlane' , recalled one foreign journalist. 'He had his own press network and when he wanted particular cover he would use journalists from outside to ensure better, more broad acceptance and coverage. ' The presence of the African liberation movements in Dar es Salaam posed a dilemma for the West. Washington and London expressed concern about their leftist inclination. Some cited this as reason enough to steer clear of the guerrillas. Others argued that it was in the West's interest not to lose touch with potential governments-in-waiting, to prevent them from slipping directly into the hands of Beijing or Moscow. 'We do not wish to find ourselves entirely isolated from and out of sympathy with the rebel movements if and when they come to obtain a share in power' , argued one British official. 34 In Dar es Salaam, contact between diplomats and the liberation movements was unavoidable. In 1965, the British high commissioner told the Foreign Office that it would be 'surprised to see the extent to which exiles and representatives of the various liberation movements circulate in diplomatic social circles here. They are to be seen at practically every National Day party or big reception' .
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The matter was complicated by Cold War geopolitics. Portugal was a key NATO ally of Britain and the United States. The strategic importance of the Azores air base, on Portuguese territory in the Atlantic, was not lost on Washington -or Lisbon. When in 1961 President John F. Kennedy adopted a more critical stance towards Portuguese colonialism at the UN and announced that Portugal's use of NATO military hardware would be restricted to the northern hemisphere, Salazar threatened to prevent the United States from renewing its soon-to-expire lease on the base. 
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Mozambicans were not alone in attracting such accusations in a public sphere pregnant with anti-Americanism. In 1967, Tanzania's minister for health and housing, Austin Shaba, was the target of an anonymous pamphlet that accused him of being a 'traitor' , 'working hand in glove with the mad dogs of CIA [sic]' . Although the government denounced the tract as 'disgraceful' , the American embassy noted that the regime, by permitting scathing attacks on Washington from ministers and the government-controlled press, had 'helped to create an atmosphere in which scurrilous pamphleteering of this sort can easily blossom. '
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FRELIMO and its discontents
Although a full analysis of the schisms within FRELIMO lies beyond the scope of this article, the developments described below can only be understood in the context of the broader dynamics of the liberation struggle. FRELIMO's early years were plagued by splits, as the leaders of the parties which were subsumed into the unified movement under Mondlane resented their reduced status. By the late 1960s, the main opposition to Mondlane within FRELIMO was clustered around the figure of Lazaro Kavandame, the movement's provincial secretary in Cabo Delgado in 'liberated' northern Mozambique. He was a Makonde, an ethnic group which straddled the Mozambican-Tanzanian frontier. Waves of Makonde had migrated northwards into Tanganyikan territory over the preceding centuries, with influxes in 1922 and 1933, as they fled exorbitant Portuguese taxes. Some were involved in the Tanganyikan independence struggle and later set up MANU -originally the Makonde African National Union. MANU's members felt slighted at their displacement by the likes of Mondlane and dos Santos, who were from southern Mozambique. However, this class divide did not produce a more revolutionary approach among the Makonde. Rather, while Mondlane, dos Santos, and Machel increasingly stressed the need for a 'People's War' and social revolution in the liberated territory, Kavandame and the so-called 'Council of Elders' , which represented a rival authority to the Central Committee, espoused a narrow, racially-defined nationalism which saw the elimination of white rule in Mozambique as an endgoal in itself. They were deeply hostile to white members of FRELIMO, like Janet Mondlane. Dos Santos -a mestiço with a white, Jewish, South African wife -also fell under suspicion. The dual ideologies that had glued together so many liberation coalitions elsewhere in Africa, socialism and nationalism, were thus uncoupled.
Rival leaders drew upon these differences to further their own personal interests. Kavandame's opposition to the transformation of Cabo Delgado was owed to the fact he was materially benefitting from the status quo. He and the chiefs working underneath him ran the province much like the Portuguese, extorting produce from the peasantry and, with the connivance of the local Tanzanian authorities, taking a cut from cross-border trade. 45 At the same time, FRELIMO's military campaign in Mozambique stalled. After making initial inroads in 1964-5, a Portuguese counteroffensive pushed back the guerrillas. The number of FRELIMO dead and lack of progress contributed to the growing resentment towards Mondlane. 46 As Michel Cahen cautions, historians should not seek to explain the subsequent crisis via strict categories. Issues of class, ethnicity, and ideological stances towards the Cold War powers all contributed to schisms, aggravated by the 'internal democratic centralism' that prevented public disagreement among the FRELIMO cadres. There was not a 'simple crisis' , but rather 'tensions at the crossroads of numerous, varied factors, without the possibility of democratic control. ' 47 These splits did not go unnoticed by the Portuguese and other foreign powers. In mid-1967, the Portuguese secret police (PIDE) reported that Chinese agents were cultivating an opposition faction to Mondlane among Mozambican workers of Makonde background at the Friendship Textile Factory, a Chinese-funded scheme in Dar es Salaam.
48
The crisis of 1968
In 1968, these pressures spilled over into open unrest, as a series of violent episodes exposed the extent of the fractures within FRELIMO. At the centre of this crisis was Mateus Gwenjere, a Roman Catholic priest. Mondlane initially supported Gwenjere when he fled to Tanzania from Mozambique in August 1967. Gwenjere was fast-tracked into FRELIMO's leadership and represented it at the UN General Assembly. Then he began to criticise FRELIMO's education policy. He tapped into discontent at the Mozambique Institute in Dar es Salaam regarding the lack of scholarship opportunities to study abroad and the leadership's insistence that students spend time fighting at the front, to foment opposition to Mondlane. Encouraged by Gwenjere, the students called for the removal of the Institute's white teachers. The ensuing stand-off resulted in the temporary closure of the Institute and reached a climax when a FRELIMO party, including Machel, raided the student dormitories on the night of 6 March. 49 Weeks later, FRELIMO was convulsed by more violence. On 6 May, a group of Mozambicans forcibly closed the movement's offices at 201 Nkrumah Street. When FRELIMO's leadership succeeded in getting the offices reopened on 8 May, the following day the group of Makonde returned, armed with clubs and machetes. In the ensuing violence, one member of the Central Committee was fatally wounded. At the time, Mondlane was in Mozambique with representatives of the Liberation Committee.
At a press conference, Simango blamed the unrest on underground Portuguese activities. He claimed that he did not recognise any of the eighteen men arrested and that none was a FRELIMO member.
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In a public statement on 26 May, Mondlane largely concurred: two of the men were former members who had deserted FRELIMO over a year before, the rest were unknown to the leadership.
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These claims were rejected in a letter from the 'Council of Elders' , printed in the Tanzanian trade union newspaper, Mfanyakazi. It accused Simango of conspiring against Mondlane, but then of shying away from cooperation with the Elders when they sought his cooperation in forcing new presidential elections. It also criticised Mondlane's 'contemptuous designs' in refusing to work with the Elders and reopening the office.
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Gwenjere was also at the heart of this latest disturbance. Mondlane told George Houser, head of the American Committee on Africa, an anticolonial pressure group, that Gwenjere had lobbied the Tanzanian civil service and the Liberation Committee to shut the FRELIMO offices and order elections. When this proved unsuccessful, Gwenjere encouraged members of his church, who were mostly Makonde, to first close the offices and then attack the reopened premises. 53 On 27 May, a Portuguese informer in Tanzania reported that 'at any moment now, there will be an attempt on the life of Dr. Mondlane to assassinate him. He will be extremely lucky if he escapes or save [sic] his life from this attempt. ' 54 Portugal sought to aggravate these divisions. According to a report produced by the Italian secret services, the SCDI, between June 1968 and October 1969, Robert Leroy carried out a series of interviews in East Africa, including with Mondlane, dos Santos, and Gwenjere. Leroy was purportedly a journalist, but in reality worked for an organisation named Aginter Press. 55 Ostensibly a publishing house, Aginter was connected to Operation GLADIO, NATO's stay-behind network of sleeper cells in Western Europe after the Second World War. Intended to coordinate resistance in the event of a Soviet invasion, GLADIO instead became associated with groups that carried out a number of false-flag terrorist attacks, which were blamed on left-wing extremists in order to whip up anti-communist sentiment and bolster conservative governments. 56 Leroy's work in Tanzania was part of Operação Zona Leste, a series of Aginter interventions against Portugal's enemies in Africa. An SDCI officer told journalist Frederic Laurent that 'Leroy's job of intoxication consisted of giving false information to the leaders of FRELIMO and of creating discord among them by playing on their personal rivalries' .
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The cosmopolitan public sphere which Mondlane skilfully used to broadcast FRELIMO's struggle to the world could therefore also be turned against him.
In these circumstances, Mondlane bowed to Kavandame's demands that FRELIMO hold a Special Congress in July, at which Kavandame and Gwenjere hoped to topple the leadership. Kavandame wanted it to be held in southern Tanzania, where his support base was strongest. Instead, Mondlane held the meeting on liberated Mozambican soil. Fearing an anti-Makonde plot, Kavandame and his supporters boycotted the Congress, at which Mondlane and dos Santos strengthened their positions. The former was re-elected president, beating Simango in a secret ballot. The Congress passed a programme that transformed FRELIMO into a more centralised 'vanguard party' , along Marxist lines.
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Concerned by the splits within FRELIMO, Nyerere intervened. In August he brought Mondlane and Kavandame together in southeastern Tanzania, but the latter refused to compromise. Instead, Kavandame pushed ahead in his attempt to set up a rival Makonde nationalist movement. He was deluded enough to think that Nyerere would support him, on the grounds that Tanzania was already providing assistance for the Biafran separatists in Nigeria. After Paulo Kankhombe, a FRELIMO representative sent to implement the reforms agreed on in July, was murdered in Cabo Delgado in December, on 3 January 1969 the Central Committee suspended Kavandame from his duties as provincial secretary.
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Tanzanian entanglements
These divisions within FRELIMO were not purely a Mozambican affair, but also involved Tanzanians pursuing their own agendas in destabilising Mondlane's position. The longer the liberation movements were based in Dar es Salaam, the more they became 'domesticated' and entangled with local political frictions. This was especially so in the case of FRELIMO, given the shared Makonde background of many Tanzanians and Mozambicans. In FRELIMO's early years, Mondlane fell back on his good relations with the Tanzanian leadership, especially Kambona, to remove dissident members. Kambona fled into exile after falling out with Nyerere. The Tanzanians henceforth responsible for the guerrillas' security were less inclined towards Mondlane.
Among these officials was Lawi Sijaona, who was tasked with refugee matters as minister of state in the office of the second vice-president, Rashidi Kawawa. A British pen-portrait described Sijaona as 'a vigilante, fanatical and lacking in humour' . 61 Like Kawawa, Sijaona was of Makonde background -a reminder of the artificiality of the colonial border at Tanzania's southern frontier. As the Portuguese military reported from Mozambique just days before Mondlane's assassination, a 'crisis which was initially an internal FRELIMO issue seems to have been generalised by Makonde connections. '
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Hostile to Tanzania's Asian commercial class, Sijaona shared Kavandame's antipathy towards Mondlane on the same anti-white, racial grounds. 63 The American embassy also believed that Sijaona resented the manner in which Mondlane frequently bypassed him in preference for dealing directly with Kawawa. 64 Sijaona divided his time between his ministerial responsibilities and his role as chairman of the TANU Youth League, the party's activist arm. The Youth League became closely associated with Maoist practices. Its 'Green Guards' , wearing shirts in the TANU colours, were consciously modelled on their Chinese counterparts. Sijaona himself had visited China as early as 1963 -before the establishment of Beijing's close relationship with Tanzania -and accompanied Nyerere on another trip in 1968. 65 These sympathies gave him common ideological ground with Simango, who was reportedly dissatisfied at FRELIMO's deepening relations with the Soviet Bloc.
Sijaona and senior civil servants in Kawawa's office deliberately undermined Mondlane. After the trouble at the Mozambique Institute, Mondlane attempted to clear rebellious students by ordering the school's closure and for the students to be sent to rural camps. In Kawawa's absence, Sijaona countermanded Mondlane's order -until Kawawa returned and overruled Sijaona. 66 Similarly, on 29 May the Tanzanian government expelled three white Portuguese teachers from the Mozambique Institute. A FRELIMO official told the East Germans that the decision was again taken in the absence of Kawawa, suggesting the hand of Sijaona. This time, when Kawawa returned, he did not overturn the order, but merely extended the deadline for the teachers' departure. 67 According to Helder Martins, a white Portuguese doctor, who was FRELIMO's director of health services and among the expelled teachers, Sijaona was also closely associated with Gwenjere. 68 The institution that was supposed to provide Mondlane's security deliberately failed to do so. On 26 April, despite opposition from Sijaona, Mondlane won Kawawa's agreement for a round-up of FRELIMO deserters and dissidents in Dar es Salaam. However, these measures were never implemented.
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In parliament, Kawawa was forced to defend his office against 61 accusations made in Mfanyakazi that the attack on the FRELIMO headquarters could have been prevented by adequate police protection. 70 In October, Mondlane told British officials in London that he believed Sijaona had known about the attack in advance -a not unlikely suggestion, given the Makonde ethnic background of both the minister and the assailants. 71 Mondlane also informed the East German consul-general that an internal Tanzanian investigation had found that many of the false accusations about him emanated from the Second Vice-President's Office, alleging that Sijaona was collaborating with the Chinese.
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In October, Sijaona was moved out of Kawawa's office to the less politically charged position of minister for health. In London, Mondlane claimed that this was the result of his petitioning of Sijaona's superiors.
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This may have played its part in Nyerere's decision, but there were other reasons. On 23 August, Sijaona had led a raucous TANU Youth League demonstration in protest at the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, during which the grounds of the Soviet embassy in Dar es Salaam were vandalised. The episode embarrassed Nyerere, who was tiring of his minister's irresponsible activities. The reshuffle also followed a pattern in which Nyerere sought to prevent potential rivals from building power-bases in settled ministries. These interwoven developments exemplified the confluences of diverse issues that typified political life in Dar es Salaam -here the Cold War in Europe, liberation movement affairs, and Tanzanian politics.
At the same time, the Tanzanian press seized on the unrest in FRELIMO to make a series of attacks on Mondlane. The Nationalist was owned by TANU, but the outspoken Marxists who dominated its editorial staff were permitted a relatively free rein by Nyerere. The day after the fight at 201 Nkrumah Street, a Nationalist editorial contemplated the reasons behind the divisions within FRELIMO and other liberation movements. ' As a result of such non-observance of the constitutional rights of ordinary members, ' it stated, 'conferences are never called to allow for members to exercise their right to choose their leaders or to endorse their trust in the existing ones. ' 74 On 27 May, the newspaper carried extracts from a speech made by Abeid Karume, vice-president of Tanzania and president of Zanzibar. At a rally in Dar es Salaam to mark Africa Liberation Day, Karume criticised the guerrilla movements for being more preoccupied with issuing news bulletins than liberating their territory. He called on their leaders to reject the bribes of 'the very imperialists we are fighting' and desist from befriending people whom they 'fully well knew were enemies' .
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Following Karume, the Nationalist delivered a brutal verdict on the liberation movements. It accused certain unnamed leaders of living 'luxuriously in air conditioned bungalows in independent African countries at a time when their own people are suffering from untold colonial cruelties. ' 'It is not rare in Dar es Salaam for example to see a freedom fighter locked in heavy drinking bouts with strange faces of white men' , it continued, warning that 'our brothers should be extra careful about such guises which the agents of the enemy may employ, through drinks, diplomatic parties or cheap bribes. '
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The target was clearly the Mondlanes. This attitude towards the liberation movements predated the unrest in FRELIMO in 1968. The previous December, the East German intelligence service, the Stasi, noted that the guerrillas were 'increasingly seen as "salon parasites" [Salonschmarotzer] in Dar es Salaam. ' 77 Such latent feeling was brought to the boil by the violent incidents concerning FRELIMO.
The extent of the opposition to Mondlane among the Tanzanian establishment was revealed again when on 23 November, the Nationalist reported on visit he had made to Nairobi. It claimed that at a private dinner there, Mondlane had briefed a group of Americans, who were in Kenya to attend the Ford Foundation-sponsored ' American-African Dialogue' meeting. Some of them had connections in the State Department. The Nationalist repeated rumours that the CIA had penetrated FRELIMO. Mondlane claimed that he had been in Kenya to meet President Jomo Kenyatta and had met the Americans by chance.
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Information passed to the British high commission in Dar es Salaam by a Zimbabwean liberation movement leader, who had spoken to Mondlane on his return flight from Nairobi, suggested the meeting was more organised than admitted.
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Wayne Fredericks, who had left the State Department the previous year, had been among the group. He observed that Mondlane seemed frustrated by the splits within FRELIMO.
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Regardless of Mondlane's honesty about his dealings in Nairobi, the Nationalist's selective use of information was another demonstration of its hostility towards him. The article was written by Nsa Kaisi, described by the American embassy as the Nationalist's 'leading Marxist true believer' .
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While condemning Mondlane's meeting with the Americans, Kaisi neglected to mention that Joseph Nyerere, brother of the president, had been in attendance too. It was also odd that the Nationalist had based its article on a story from the Daily Nation, a Kenyan newspaper that had been banned in Tanzania the previous month, having long been attacked by the Nationalist as a vehicle of 'imperialist' propaganda.
Houser, who attended the meeting in Nairobi and then travelled onwards to Dar es Salaam, noted in a letter to the editor of Newsweek magazine that the incident and the Nationalist reports had produced 'a great deal of flak' . Houser spoke to President Nyerere about the situation. He considered the Nationalist's articles 'ridiculous' , but added that 'we don't censor everything that goes into the paper. ' 82 Private criticism of Mondlane was heard elsewhere in government circles. safety. He was rumoured to have asked Nyerere in mid-December to expel Gwenjere from Tanzania in connection with the murder of Kankhombe. According to the French embassy, Nyerere flatly refused. A number of Gwenjere's supporters were arrested, however, and when the priest approached the police to request their release on 28 December, he too was placed under detention, though all were released on 6 January.
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In mid-January, Portuguese intelligence in Mozambique reported that the crisis inside FRELIMO was worsening due to the conflict between Kavandame and Mondlane. 
Who killed Eduardo Mondlane?
The Tanzanian Criminal Investigation Department (CID) took up the murder case. It soon recognised the Soviet stamp on the parcel as a forgery.
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The remnants of the device -plus two further bombs encased in Plekhanov volumes, addressed to dos Santos and Simango and intercepted by the police in the following weeks -were sent to London for analysis by Scotland Yard. Through Interpol, they found that the batteries in the detonators had been manufactured in Japan and sold by a firm in Lourenço Marques (present-day Maputo). The police believed that the bomb had been constructed in Mozambique and then inserted into Mondlane's mailbag in Dar es Salaam. This information was not made public, but was communicated by a deputy CID officer to the American embassy; and later by Geoffrey Sawaya, head of the CID, to David Martin, a British journalist.
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The assassination has never been satisfactorily explained. Despite concluding its investigation in May 1969, the CID kept silent for three years. In February 1972, Radio Tanzania announced that the police knew who had killed Mondlane, but refused to name him, as he was a Portuguese resident in Mozambique. 91 Martin published a story in the Observer, which used insider information from the Tanzanian police to establish the technical specifics involved in the bombing. However, no culprit was revealed.
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More recently, historians have blended oral testimony with archival research, but still no smoking gun has been found. As Duarte de Jesus outlines, both the Soviet Union and China had vested interests in eliminating Mondlane, as the moderate tip of a movement lurching to the left. 94 However, the broad consensus is that the plan was hatched by the Portuguese, with African collaboration in transporting the bomb to Dar es Salaam.
Lisbon was caught off guard by the assassination. An Overseas Ministry report concluded that although the turmoil arising from Mondlane's death represented a short-term advantage to Portugal, the long-term consequences of a more revolutionary FRELIMO were far more disadvantageous. 95 The PIDE also distanced itself from the crime. An internal report into the murder concluded that responsibility for the assassination, plus the unrest within FRELIMO over the previous year, lay with Beijing.
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Even if we accept this denial as genuine, the absence of 'official' PIDE participation does not preclude the involvement of Portuguese agents, via the clandestine Aginter Press network. Several sources have claimed that the bomb was assembled by Casimiro Monteiro, a Goan-born explosives expert and Aginter operative. Monteiro had fought for Franco during the Spanish Civil War, for Hitler with the Division Azul on the Eastern Front, and murdered the Portuguese opposition leader Humberto Delgado in Spain in 1965. He later fought for the anti-communist Mozambique National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, RENAMO) against FRELIMO in post-independence Mozambique's civil war. Monteiro was first named as a participant in the assassination plot by Martin in 1975 . This has been corroborated by two PIDE agents and a Rhodesian intelligence officer, though there remains scepticism as to whether their stories can be trusted. 97 The question of Mozambican involvement also remains unclear. The logistics of delivering the bomb to Dar es Salaam must have required some African collaboration. However, no consensus has emerged. Substantial space would be required for a full exploration of the myriad allegations and refutations that continue to mark Mozambican politics, in what has become a memory war entangled with the country's post-independence travails. 98 Martin's 1972 Observer article identified two prime suspects. Kavandame was questioned by the CID a week after Mondlane's death, but gave little away. In March, he defected to the Portuguese. Silvério Nungu, an official at FRELIMO's headquarters with access to Mondlane's mail, was the CID's other main suspect. Arrested by the Tanzanian police while trying to defect to Mozambique, Nungu officially died of a hunger strike in prison. Simango later claimed he was executed. 99 the death of Mondlane. Under FRELIMO's constitution, the vice-president should haveglorify the revolution. 108 They did not deny the schisms within the movement, but integrated them into a heroic narrative, in which the progressive proto-state overcomes Kavandame's backward, parochial tribalism, then joins forces with the oppressed Mozambican peasantry to drive out the Portuguese colonialists.
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Building on more recent scholarship which questions these obfuscating binaries and Marxist teleologies, this article has demonstrated how the micropolitics of FRELIMO, in its Dar es Salaam exile, were rife with tensions. These did not only take place within the movement's leadership, but overlapped with centrifugal dynamics among a range of local actors in the 'Cold War city' . While Mondlane skilfully utilised Dar es Salaam's position at the epicentre of international politics in sub-Saharan Africa to attract material aid and public support, the same environment was exploited by FRELIMO's enemies to subvert the movement. Despite having Nyerere's backing, there were limits to the security this provided. Tanzanian politicians and journalists, sharing ideological, racial, and ethnic affinities with Mondlane's opponents, attacked FRELIMO's leader, eroding his support base. These dynamics came together in the rumour-filled environment of Dar es Salaam, which bred uncertainty and distrust. The city's politics complicated the efforts by actors based in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing to influence the late decolonisations in Africa. The textured histories which emerge through this urban aperture thus foreground the agency of Africans and disrupt conventional narratives of both the global superpower rivalry and liberation struggles in the Third World.
